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Fichte and the Relationship 
between Self-Positing and Rights
N e d i m  N o m e R
f i c h t e  a n d  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t w e e n  s e l f - p o s i t i n g  a n d  r i g h t s 1
in this paper i intend to elucidate a thesis that lies at the heart of Fichte’s 
theory of rights. This thesis states that rights are the essential foundation of ratio-
nal political order not only because they govern relations among human beings 
but also because they help them to realize themselves as free agents. in Fichte’s 
words, rights are the “conditions” under which human beings can become aware 
of themselves as “self-positing subjects.”2 
This thesis calls for the rejection of the claim central to natural rights theories 
that the main task of rights is to protect liberties that human beings have by virtue 
of their “natural” or “God-given” qualities.3 This is because Fichte’s thesis implies 
that rights are constitutive (at least in part) of free agency. An anticipation of this 
thesis can be found in Rousseau’s idea of moral liberty,4 but it is Fichte who devel-
ops this thesis into a full-blown theory of entitlement as well as of political govern-
ment. A version of this thesis later becomes a centerpiece of Hegel’s social theory, 
according to which social institutions are formative of individual identity.5 
Nedim Nomer is Assistant Professor of Social and Political Sciences at Sabanci University 
(istanbul).
1 i am indebted to Fred Neuhouser, deanna Nass, and michelle Kosch for their invaluable com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre (1796/7) 
[Naturrecht], vol. 3 of Sämmtliche Werke [SW iii], ed. i. H. Fichte (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 1845–46), 1–12. 
All references to Fichte’s works, apart from the Wissenschaftslehre Nova Methodo, are to this edition. i 
have also occasionally consulted J.G. Fichte. Foundations of the Natural Right, ed. Frederick Neuhouser, 
trans. michael Baur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
3 Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), ch. 1. 
4 J.J. Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, ed. P. Gay, trans. d. Cress (Hackett, 1987), 150–51.
5 Ludwig Siep, Praktische Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus (Frankfurt am main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 
chs. 2–3; Robert Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 
chs. 3–5; Robert Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
ch. 7; Frederick Beiser, German Idealism (Cambridge, mA: Harvard University Press, 2002), ch. 4.
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Yet this thesis creates a tension within Fichte’s theory of rights because, contrary 
to what it asserts, freedom as self-positing seems impossible in a society organized 
around rights. in the Foundations of Natural Right (hereafter Naturrecht), Fichte 
characterizes self-positing as the conscious act of making one’s own determina-
tions, or as “self-determination.”6 Yet what a right-holder may be, do or acquire 
in a law-governed society is not entirely up to that right-holder, since the content 
and scope of such liberties would be regulated by the government according to 
the principles of entitlement that are upheld in that society. And this seems to 
indicate that rights would hinder rather than facilitate the conception of oneself 
as a self-determining subject.
Fichte is not unaware of the air of paradox in his thesis; in fact he draws the 
attention of his readers to it (SW iii.85). But in so doing, Fichte’s aim is not to 
admit of a flaw in his reasoning, but to formulate the task that his political theory 
is intended to accomplish, which is to establish that one can “depend on one’s 
own will” while “standing with others in a state of mutual dependence” that typifies 
rights-governed relations. Fichte argues further that the conjunction of these two 
states accounts for the possibility of a “society of free beings.” For Fichte, then, 
what seems to be a paradox is in fact the central task facing a rational political 
society.
However, despite the centrality of the thesis (regarding rights as constitutive of 
agency) to his political theory, Fichte makes remarkably little effort to go beyond 
the provocative articulation of it, and his further relevant remarks are too cursory 
to add up to a clear and consistent argument. it is therefore not surprising that 
some commentators have argued that Fichte fails to provide the required link 
between subjectivity and social membership.7 The reason for this failure, it is of-
ten argued, lies in the nature of Fichte’s political theory, which deals mainly with 
the question of social peace and therefore is not suited for the task of grounding 
freedom itself.
in what follows, i resist this verdict and explain how rights can indeed serve as 
conditions of subjectivity. The key to this explanation lies in Fichte’s account of 
social interaction, according to which self-determination is possible only in a social 
setting. The idea is that “social interaction” (Wechselwirkung) urges or “summons” 
(Aufforderung) the parties to exercise powers and capacities within themselves, of 
which they otherwise would not be aware (SW iii.33). However, while there can be 
6 Fichte’s expressions are sich selbst bestimmen (SW iii.19) or Selbstbestimmung (SW iii.32–33).
7 Ludwig Siep, “methodische und Systematische Probleme in Fichtes Grundlage des Naturrechts” 
in Der Transzendentale Gedanke, ed. K Hammacher (Hamburg: Felix meiner Verlag, 1977), 290–306; 
Richard Schottky, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Staatsphilosophischen Vertragstheorie in 17. und 18. 
Jahrhundert (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), 162; Frederick Beiser, German Idealism, ch. 8; Robert Willi-
ams, Recognition (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), ch. 3; Hansjürgen Verweyen, Recht und Sittlichkeit in J .G. 
Fichtes Gesellschaftslehre (Freiburg: Karl Alber Verlag, 1975), 85–106; Frederick Neuhouser, “Fichte and 
the Relationship between Right and morality,“ in Fichte: Historical Contexts/Contemporary Controversies, 
ed. d. Breazeale and T. Rockmore (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1994), 158–80. This criticism was 
first made by Hegel in the Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie (Hamburg: 
Felix meiner Verlag, 1962), 39–74. For more on Hegel’s criticism of Fichte on this point, see Robert 
Williams, “Recognition, Right and Social Contract” in Rights, Bodies and Recognition, ed. T. Rockmore 
and d. Breazeale (Surrey: Ashgate, 2006), 26–44.
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no doubt that Fichte takes social interaction to be necessary for self-consciousness, 
it is not as clear how he construes the relationship between self-consciousness and 
membership in a law-governed society. This ambiguity arises since Fichte leaves 
open the question of why a subject should limit its actions to accommodate the 
rights of others.8 i will argue on Fichte’s behalf that respect for the rights of oth-
ers would follow from the realization that self-determination ultimately calls for 
participation in a collectively determined social order. This would be a society 
organized around the mutual rights of its members.
To assess the plausibility of this interpretation and whether it can counter 
the above criticism, we first need to understand what exactly Fichte means by 
self-positing or self-determination. Then we must examine his reasons for claim-
ing that such freedom can be realized only in a social setting. Finally, we must 
clarify the role that rights would play in the kind of social setting that facilitates 
such freedom. it is crucial to note at the outset that if we can elucidate the link 
between subjectivity and rights, we will be able to understand not only the thesis 
that underlies Fichte’s political theory, but also how this theory fits into his broader 
account of the human subject.
1 .  T h e  I d e a  o f  S e l f - P o s i t i n g
The first point to make about “self-positing” is that Fichte uses this phrase to refer 
to what he takes to be the essential nature of human consciousness. He believes 
that consciousness does not have an invariably fixed nature, as it repeatedly re-
constitutes itself.9 The only general and stable fact about consciousness then is 
that it “posits itself.” on Fichte’s account, to say that self-positing is the essence of 
consciousness is to say that self-positing underlies and makes possible all the basic 
functions of consciousness including cognition and volition. Here we are interested 
in the formation of the will and its expression in the sensible world, including 
the social world. our task, then, must be to find out how the will’s relation to that 
world can take the form of self-positing. But let us first be clear on what it means 
for consciousness to posit itself.
in the Naturrecht, Fichte makes three central observations about consciousness. 
The first is that consciousness is capable of engaging in an activity of which it is the 
“ultimate” ground (SW iii.17). Fichte considers cognition and volition as instantia-
tions of such mental activity. Second, consciousness is capable of determining the 
content of its own activity. it does so by “positing” a concept of an object or of an 
8 Das venünftige Wesen ist nicht absolut durch den Charakter der Vernünftigkeit verbunden, die Freiheit aller 
Vernunfwesen ausser ihm zu wollen; dieser Satz ist die Grenzscheidung zwischen Naturrecht und Moral (SW iii.88). 
many commentators argue that Fichte’s separation of morality and rights complicates his task of ac-
counting for a stable legal system. See, for example, Ludwig Siep, “Naturrecht und Wissenschaftslehre” 
in Fichtes Lehre vom Rechtverhältniss, ed. m. Kahlo, e. Wolff, and R. Zaczyk (Frankfurt am main: Vittorio 
Klostermann Verlag, 1992), 71–91; Wolfgang Kersting, “die Unabhängigkeit des Rechts von der moral” 
in Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Grundlage des Naturrechts, ed. Jean-Christophe merle (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
2001), 21–37; Axel Honneth, “die Transzendentale Notwendigkeit von intersubjectivität,” in Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte: Grundlage des Naturrechts, ed. Jean-Christophe merle (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2001), 
63–80; Frederick Neuhouser, introduction to J.G. Fichte. Foundations of the Natural Right, ed. Frederick 
Neuhouser, trans. michael Baur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
9 Das Ich ist ins Unendliche bestimmbar (SW iii.28).
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end. For example, the material world can be represented only if it is identified or 
posited by consciousness as an “object” that exists independently of the “subject” 
(SW iii.17). The third observation is that when consciousness posits a particular 
concept, it becomes “determinate.” This is because it acquires particular quali-
ties as it operates and evolves in line with a specific concept; thus each concept 
implies a “particular modification of thought” (SW iii.53).10 This means in effect 
that consciousness fashions itself in line with concepts that it posits for itself. For 
Fichte, these ideas combine to reveal what consciousness essentially is, namely, an 
activity that rises above itself, “turns back upon” itself, and enters into a relation 
with itself through which it constitutes itself. Thus consciousness is essentially the 
activity of self-positing.
For Fichte, the awareness that one has a self-positing consciousness is the key to 
self-conception of subjectivity (SW iii.20). For one would thus realize that one can 
determine one’s thoughts and desires without depending on anything external to 
oneself and, in so doing, think of oneself as a self-standing unit of conscious activity, 
or as a “subject.” Note that such self-conception would also include the sense of 
oneself as a “determinate” or “finite” being. For, as indicated, determinacy neces-
sarily follows from the ordinary operations of consciousness: thinking or wanting 
is always thinking or wanting (the concept of) a particular object. it follows that 
self-conception of subjectivity involves a determination of what one is not: when one 
commits oneself to a particular cognitive or volitional object, one rules out other 
possible forms of thinking and wanting. As Fichte himself puts it, “it is the very 
nature of the human mind to posit itself and to oppose a Not-i to itself.”11
This is not to say that self-conception of subjectivity can be reduced to discrete 
mental acts of thinking or wanting particular objects. if such self-conception 
stems from the awareness of the self-positing nature of consciousness, then it 
would be open to, and inclusive of, all (possible and actual) mental acts without 
being reducible to any of them. This is because self-positing is the way conscious-
ness posits or determines its objects regardless of their particular contents. in this 
regard, consciousness and, with this, self-conception of subjectivity are “infinitely 
determinable” rather than merely determinate (SW iii.28).
For Fichte, however, complete self-conception must somehow synthesize both 
aspects of subjectivity, i.e. determinateness and infinite determinability. The solu-
tion he offers in the Naturrecht may be summed up as follows: self-conception of 
subjectivity involves self-ascription of a consciousness that is the ultimate ground of 
its own determinations; however, while every conscious act is governed by a freely 
determined (concept of an) object, consciousness itself cannot be exclusively 
identified with any particular object, because it can always posit itself “in opposi-
tion to” any such object and determine itself in a different way (SW iii.28–29, 57, 
10 See also J G. Fichte, Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre (1789) 
[Sittenlehre], SW iV.32–34.
11 J. G. Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy. Wissenschaftelehre Nova Methodo (1796/99), 
trans. and ed. daniel Breazeale (ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 99. For the formulation 
of the same idea in the Naturrecht, see §2.
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60–61). This image of subjectivity is consistent with Fichte’s relevant statements 
in the versions of the Wissenschaftslehre in the period of 1796–99.12
in any case, Fichte makes it clear that subjectivity entails a great deal more than 
merely having a self-positing mind. it also calls for the ability to translate one’s 
thoughts into external action and bring about changes in the sensible world (SW 
iii.9). Thus self-consciousness of subjectivity requires “finding” oneself as such in 
that world (SW iii.33–4). This is not a point Fichte makes in passing; it permeates 
his practical philosophy, including his political and legal theory.13 it is therefore 
no accident that one of the “theorems” of the Naturrecht is that “free efficacy in 
the sensible world” is part of what it takes to become aware of oneself as a subject 
(SW iii.17).
i take it that Fichte’s emphasis on world-relatedness stems from his commit-
ment to the unity of consciousness. That is, if self-positing is the essential nature 
of consciousness, as Fichte maintains, then such activity must underlie all of a 
subject’s consciously committed deeds, including its deliberate orientation to the 
sensible world. otherwise the external deeds of the subject would not be consistent 
with its nature as a subject. This is, at any rate, an inference that Fichte upholds 
in the Naturrecht, where he stipulates that a subject’s relation to the “outer” world 
must be consistent with, and indicative of, its “original and essential” nature as 
self-positing (SW iii.9, 19–20). 
it should then be fair to say that Fichte’s idea of freedom is more demand-
ing than Kant’s, in that it takes participation in the sensible world as essential to 
freedom. What matters for Kant is whether the free agent is capable of pure will-
ing, even if such willing is not linked to anything that takes place in the sensible 
world.14 From Fichte’s stance, Kant subscribes not only to a narrow conception 
of freedom, but also to a pessimistic view of the world-interactive capabilities of 
human beings. We must keep in mind, however, that Fichtean subjectivity does 
not lend itself to just any form of world-relatedness; it requires that this relation 
take the form of self-positing.
For Fichte, one can establish such a relation to the sensible world only if one’s 
external deeds are governed by self-determined “purposive concepts.”15 That is, 
one can think of oneself as the “ultimate” ground of one’s world-directed deeds 
if one’s freely espoused goals (and only they) determine not just whether one acts 
but also what one achieves in the world. Fichte also makes it clear, however, that 
one cannot find oneself as a subject in the sensible world by simply acting on 
12 J.G. Fichte, Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre (1797), SW i.477–78. in Nova Methodo (122) 
Fichte writes, “Nothing determinate is possible apart from what is determinable, i.e. without intuit-
ing the one along the other.” in the Sittenlehre Fichte expresses the same thought as follows: Ich folge 
freilich dem Triebe, aber doch mit dem Gedanken, dass ich ihm auch nicht hätte folgen können … nur unter dieser 
Bedingung ist Selbstbewusstseyn und Bewusstseyn überhaupt möglich (SW iV.135). 
13 Ich finde mich als wirkend in der Sinnenwelt. Davon hebt alles Bewusstseyn an (SW iV.3). in Nova Methodo 
(444) Fichte writes, “i am unable to think of my own identity as an active intellect without also thinking 
of a thing which, in the process of sensibilization, i may be a product of my own physical efficacy.”
14 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. L. W. Beck, (indianapolis: Hackett, 
1969), ¶¶ 394, 400.
15 Das Bilden des Begriffes von einer vorgesetzten Wirksamkeit ausser uns, oder von einem Zwecke (SW 
iii.19).
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one’s freely espoused goals. Full and effective self-realization requires, further, 
that one control the environment in which one seeks to realize one’s goals. oth-
erwise one would be confronted with an environment that systematically thwarts 
rather than facilitates the realization of one’s ends. Presumably with his concern 
in mind, Fichte submits that free efficacy calls for the “capability to alter all mat-
ter in the sensible world and mold it according to one’s concepts.”16 He sums up 
these ideas as follows: “as a condition of self-consciousness … the sensible world 
must be constituted in a particular way and it must stand in a certain relation to 
our body” (SW iii.71–72). The unstated premise here is that self-conception of 
subjectivity partly depends on the composition of the sensible world, for one can 
“find” oneself as such only if one reconstitutes it in line with one’s own ends. The 
question that arises here is how, if at all, this task can be achieved. more concretely, 
how can a human being acquire the capacity to “modify all matter” and realize 
himself or herself as a subject in the sensible world? 
2 .  t h e  s e n s i b l e  w o r l d
So far we have talked about the sensible world in a rather general way, but such 
talk could be misleading, since Fichte in fact divides this world into two parts. 
He portrays the first part as “hard and resistant,” but the second as “supple and 
modifiable.”17 The first is made up of material objects and natural events, while 
the second is constituted by human actions. Though meaningful in theory, Fichte 
finds this distinction not always clear in practice. This is, first, because it is not im-
mediately clear how free actions can be distinguished in the sensible world from 
actions from necessity (SW iii.45). Second, human beings do not always treat one 
another as free and rational even when they have reasons to believe that they are 
in the presence of such a being (SW iii.87).
All the same, Fichte argues that human beings cannot realize themselves as 
subjects through their relations to the material world, but they can find them-
selves as such in the company of others.18 This thesis breaks into two sub-claims. 
The first is that membership in a well-constituted social order is a “condition” of 
self-conception of subjectivity;19 and the second sub-claim is that a “summoning” 
impact by another human is the “point of origin” of human consciousness (SW 
iii.53, 61–62). Both claims are stipulations about the makeup of the sensible 
world and therefore are consistent with Fichte’s account of “finding” oneself as a 
subject in that world. in this section and next i consider the first sub-claim, and i 
leave the discussion of the second to the last section.
The claim concerning the link between self-conscious subjectivity and social 
membership may come as a surprise, for it seems to contradict Fichte’s remarks 
about the difficulties of inter-human relations. it also seems paradoxical to argue 
16 Die Kraft alle Materie in der Sinnenwelt zu modificieren und sie nach meinen Begriffen zu bilden (SW 
iii.68–69).
17 Fichte’s expressions are subtile und feine Materie, modificabel durch den blossen Willen, and zähe 
haltbare Materie (SW iii.61–80). 
18 Dass das vernünftige Wesen sich nicht als ein solches mit Selbstbewussteyn setzen kann, ohne sich als ein 
individuum, als Eins unter mehreren vernünftigen Wesen zu setzen (SW iii.8).
19 Gemeinschaft freier Wesen ... als Möglichkeit des Selbstbewusstseyns (SW iii.7–9, 72–73).
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that social association facilitates true freedom while social life typically calls for 
the limitation of the freedom of the parties. Fichte is not unaware of these chal-
lenges. He realizes that a well-constituted society requires that each limit his or 
her “freedom through the freedom of all others” (SW iii.15). Fichte also admits 
that the possibility of mutual aggression cannot be fully eliminated in inter-human 
relations.20 But none of this prevents him from restating this claim throughout 
the Naturrecht. more crucially, he regards this claim as providing a link between 
his political theory and his account of subjectivity (SW iii.1–12). Accordingly, he 
motivates his political theory as follows:
Persons as such must be absolutely free and dependent solely on their will. Persons, 
as certainly as they are persons, must stand with one another in a state of mutual 
influence, and therefore not depend solely on themselves. The task of the science 
of rights is to show how both can be held. And the question that lies at the heart of 
such science is: How is a society of free beings as such possible? (SW iii.85).
Fichte submits here that the members of a well-constituted society would depend 
“solely” on their own wills. Yet he also admits that “dependence on others” is 
inevitable in social life. This is partly because whether and to what extent one 
is free in a society depends on the approval of others. interestingly, Fichte does 
not regard these two states as mutually exclusive; on the contrary, he submits that 
volitional independence is compatible with dependence on others (in certain 
respects). He also asserts that this compatibility is characteristic of membership 
in a rational political order—which is yet to be described. So it is not surprising 
that Fichte considers the elucidation of this compatibility as the central task of 
his political theory.
Fichte clearly follows Rousseau in so formulating the aim of his political theory, 
since Rousseau also wants to portray a society that allows each to be (in some sense) 
autonomous. Fichte keeps with Rousseau also in supposing that the “society of free 
beings” is possible only under commonly accepted laws. Yet the accord between 
Fichte and Rousseau ceases once we move beyond this general way of describ-
ing their theories. Fichte does not share Rousseau’s hope that in a well-ordered 
society each would be “as free as before.” instead he argues that human beings 
first become aware of their capacity for freedom upon their entry into society. 
Fichte also rejects Rousseau’s claim that, in a well-ordered society, there would 
be no need for institutions that protect the interests of the people vis-à-vis the 
“legislator” since it would presumably embody the general will.21 For Fichte, such 
institutions are essential to defending the interests of the people from the threat 
of tyranny of majority or of political leadership. These differences are crucial not 
only to grasping Fichte’s political theory, but also to correctly identifying its place 
in the history of ideas. Before reaching a verdict on the distinctiveness of Fichte’s 
views, however, we must look closely at how he justifies his claim that volitional 
independence of individuals would not be compromised in a society.
20 Das aber nachdem Selbstbewusstseyn gesetzt ist immerfort vernünftige Wesen auf das Subject desselben 
vernünftigerweise einwirken müssen ist dadurch nicht gesetzt (SW iii.87).
21 Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, 162–65.
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To begin, it may be helpful to briefly consider why Fichte believes that involve-
ment in the material world cannot lead to self-conception of subjectivity. This 
belief rests on two observations. The first is that the material world is “neither 
produced nor producible” by human beings (SW iii.29); the second is that the 
material world operates according to “mechanical” natural laws, such as the law 
of gravity, that cannot be violated or altered by human beings (SW iii.115–16, 
216). Such laws limit not only what human beings can achieve but also how they 
can act in the material world. 
These findings do not establish, however, that human beings are paralyzed by 
the material world (SW iii.28–29, 82–85, 116). That world does not interfere with 
the human capacity to set one’s ends and look for ways of actualizing them in the 
world. Also, human beings can enhance their world-interactive capabilities and 
so expand the scope of their efficacy. So, for example, thanks to the agricultural 
technologies they develop, human beings can determine the amount of food sup-
plies at their disposal without depending on the accidents of nature. So it is not 
just that human beings choose the way they relate to the material world, but also 
that they can realize some of their ends independently of it. Yet none of this can 
alter the fact that the material world puts certain insurmountable limitations on 
human striving, limitations over which human beings have no control whatever. 
The social world, in contrast, is controlled entirely by human beings, as it is con-
stituted by human beings in the first place (SW iii.9–16, 73). This does not mean 
that all human beings are always fully aware of the role they play in the formation 
of the social order, nor that they always agree on all aspects of it. Fichte’s point is 
merely that human beings are capable of determining the nature of the society 
they live in. He thus subscribes to an account of the social order that is espoused 
by all theories of social contract, namely, that it is ultimately up to human beings 
to decide how they relate to another.
But it is crucial to note that Fichte differs from his predecessors about the best 
way of instituting a society. Unlike Locke or Kant, he does not think that society 
is best organized around a particular public morality or religion that is conceived 
independently of, or prior to, social practice. Fichte also rejects Hobbes’ claim 
that social peace is possible only under absolutist rule. According to Fichte, hu-
man beings can determine the norms or institutions of their association without 
necessarily needing an external moral or political authority. 
most of the Naturrecht is devoted to explaining how such a society is possible. 
Such a society requires, above all, that each limit his or her “freedom through 
the freedom of all others” (SW iii.15). That is, each must enjoy an inviolable 
“sphere” of liberty. Yet each must do so in ways that are acceptable to others. Thus 
the Fichtean society would be organized around commonly acceptable limits on 
external freedom. The assumption here is that human beings can agree on the 
content of the constraints that can bind all. Yet once again, this agreement would 
not be deduced from an abstract morality or religion; rather it is a matter of find-
ing a “balance” (Gleichgewicht) among the interests of the parties (SW iii.120–36). 
Accordingly, Fichte believes that part of the interactions among human beings 
always take the form of a negotiation that is intended to yield such a balance or a 
decision to uphold a previously established one (SW iii.15–16). 
477self -pos i t i n g  a n d  r i g hts  i n  f i c ht e
So Fichtean society does not emerge “behind the backs of” human beings; it is 
an intended creation of the parties involved. But it is also clear that such society 
generates constraints on how one may act in public. From this, it seems to follow 
that social association does not remove the constraints on human freedom; rather 
it adds to the already existing ones, namely, those human beings encounter in the 
material world. if so, the critics seem right in raising doubts as to the coherence 
of Fichte’s claim that social membership leads to self-conception of subjectivity.
Fichte does not deny that human beings must limit their external actions in 
some way to peacefully coexist in the world, but he does not regard such self-
limitation as a limitation of freedom as such.22 on the contrary, he argues that 
the decision to self-limit to leave room for the actions of others is a “distinctive 
criterion” of freedom.23 Such freedom can be portrayed as being the “sole” ground 
of one’s determinations in the sensible world, or as “self-determination.” The 
idea here is that by limiting one’s actions to a particular external sphere, one not 
only realizes one’s will in a determinate way, but also initiates a particular kind of 
relationship to others; one determines oneself as sociable (SW iii.46). 
But merely asserting that voluntary self-limitation can be seen as an instance 
of self-determination is not the same as explaining why self-determination takes 
the form of self-limitation. it is also unclear whether and how self-determination, 
so actualized, can lead to self-conception of subjectivity.
3 .  s u b j e c t i v i t y  a n d  t h e  s o c i a l  w h o l e
Part of Fichte’s response to these questions comes in his account of citizenship. 
on this account, individual citizens are at the center of social life. Thus, social 
institutions do not take on a life of their own and cast out the agents who create 
them; rather they are the modifiable results of the mutual actions and commit-
ments of individual citizens. For Fichte, as we shall see, participation in this col-
lective process of defining and/or redefining social institutions is what it means 
to be self-determining in society. And such freedom, i will argue, is what in turn 
makes self-ascription of subjectivity possible. in other words, subjectivity in the 
sensible world takes the form of self-determining individuality in a suitably orga-
nized social order.
A concise statement of Fichte’s account of citizenship can be found in his as-
sertion that “the state is nothing but an abstract concept; only citizens as such are 
the actual persons.”24 Fichte’s point here is not to deny the existence of the state, 
but to clarify the sense in which it can be said to exist: it exists only as a concept 
that arises from and reflects the nature of interactions among individual citizens. 
That is, the state is a set of rules or norms that human beings deliberately create 
and uphold in their mutual relations. For Fichte, then, the concept of the state 
22 Da sie aber frei gesetzt sind, so könnte eine solche Grenze nicht ausserhalb der Freiheit liegen, als wodurch 
diese aufgehoben, keineswegs aber als Freiheit beschränkt würde (SW iii.9).
23 Welche Selbstbeschränkung eben das ausschliessende Kriterium der Vernunft ist (SW iii.66). 
24 Der Staat an sich ist nichts als ein abstracter Begriff: nur die Bürger, als solche, sind wirkliche Personen 
(SW iii.371).
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cannot have any meaning “in and for itself,” as Hegel has it;25 it is only what indi-
vidual citizens think and make of it. 
For Fichte, the claim that individual citizens are the only actual agents of the 
social world is bound up with the further claim that they are also the only sources 
of value. The latter claim has two aspects. The first is that each citizen is equally 
worthy, which is a reiteration of Kant’s idea that each human being is an end in 
itself (SW iii.80–85). The second aspect of Fichte’s claim is that society has value 
only if it has value for individual citizens.26 So it is only in a manner of speaking that 
institutions or norms are inherently valuable; the “sole” goal of social association, 
and whatever it entails, is the protection of the interests of citizens regarded one by 
one. Note that this claim is not about the content of human interests, but about their 
role in grounding social values; so it can lend itself to a variety of interpretations 
of the value of social association. According to this claim, for example, it would 
not be irrational for individual citizens to regard social ends as part of their final 
ends or appreciate the company of one another for its sake.
Fichte does not work out these claims in detail, but he indicates the reasons for 
his unwillingness to ascribe agency to social institutions such as the state. one of 
these reasons is that social institutions are open to the manipulation of individuals 
or groups at the expense of others (SW iii.155–58). This may not be a drawback 
for institutions that are intended to promote the interests of particular groups, 
such as trade unions. But it would be damaging to legislative or judicial institutions, 
such as the courts, that are intended to be impartial (SW iii.167). Partiality in such 
institutions may generate inequalities of power and wealth and thus jeopardize 
the social peace. Fichte’s point in any event would remain the same: neutrality of 
social institutions is not a matter of course; an institution can exemplify that virtue 
only if the people involved decide to organize themselves in that way.
A further reason for not ascribing agency to institutions is that they cannot 
adapt to changes in society all of their own accord.27 Fichte takes it that the hu-
man society is shaped to a large extent by “material” conditions, i.e. by such 
socio-economic factors as the size of the population, the level of technology, and 
the character and size of the economy (SW iii.14–15, 106–7, 160–61).28 Such 
objective yet variable facts are pertinent not just to the quality of life, but also to 
the distribution of material resources in a society. Thus, Fichte submits, the laws 
of a well-constituted society must always be consistent with the material condi-
tions of that society. But he realizes that this does not occur automatically. This is, 
first, because laws cannot anticipate and address all possible changes in material 
conditions.29 Also, and more crucially, institutions, including those involved in 
25 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), §§142–45, 258. 
26 Freie nur von sich selbst abhängige Person, und diese Freiheit eben ist es, die ihm durch die Staatsgewalt 
gesichert ist, und um deren willen allein er den Vertrag einging (SW iii.206).
27 Die zwingende Macht müsse … eine solche seyn deren Selbsterhaltung bedingt sey durch ihre stete Wirksamkeit: 
die sonach, wenn sie einmal unthäthig ist, auf immer vernichtet wird; … da diese Ordnung der Dinge nicht von 
selbst eintreten, wenigstens nicht nach einer Regel und ununterbrochen stattfinden dürfte (SW iii.157). 
28 For more on this point, see my “Fichte and the idea of Liberal Socialism,” Journal of Political 
Philosophy 13 (2005): 53–73.
29 [D]as Gesetz muss sich jetzt ändern, um diesem ganz veränderten Volke noch anpassend zu seyn (SW 
iii.185). The only law or norm to which this does not apply is the principle that underlies all possible
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legislation, tend toward inertia; they typically seek consistency in their practices 
and follow the existing laws in the face of pressures to the contrary.30 So, for ex-
ample, a rise in the number of the poor and unemployed in society would not 
necessarily lead to a change in the practices of existing political institutions. Thus, 
Fichte contends, economically or political disfranchised individuals or groups must 
not passively wait for the existing institutions to immediately detect and solve all 
of their problems; they must be prepared to act on their own (SW iii.182–83). 
To that end they may try to raise awareness about the inequalities they endure, 
seek the support of others, and push for changes in laws that benefit some at the 
expense of others. depending on the nature of the issues at stake, they may also 
ask for reform in the institutional makeup of the society.
Fichte also has in mind situations in which institutions lose their relevance 
for social relations as a result of radical shifts in human interests. Human beings 
sometimes develop interests in objects or activities, such as settling in previously 
unoccupied parts of the world that are not governed by pre-existing laws (SW 
iii.131–32). Such developments create uncertainties in social relations as they 
lead to legally and morally uncharted areas of rivalry and call for new normative 
or institutional structures.
The conclusion that emerges from these points is not that social institutions 
do not play any role in social life, but that social interaction is not always neces-
sarily pre-defined or pre-structured by them. That is, institutions cannot entirely 
eliminate the “indeterminacy” or “uncertainty” of the ways in which human be-
ings relate to one another. This is not to say that social relations always take the 
form of a “war of all against all.” Such war for Fichte is possible but not intrinsic 
to every interaction, as Hobbes alleges. indeed, Fichte takes it that the uncertainty 
in a social setting may well lead to stronger social ties: “This indeterminacy, this 
uncertainty as to which individual will first be attacked, which is an oscillation in 
the imagination, is the bond of social union. it is that through which all merge 
into one … a whole that is to be protected” (SW iii.203). Fichte hypothesizes here 
that the uncertainty in a social setting creates a sense of vulnerability for all. This 
sense amounts to the awareness of the constant possibility of being harmed by 
others. The harm can take the form of an attack by an individual or group against 
one’s life or property. or it can be a general state of injustice that benefits some 
at the expense of others. For Fichte, the proper response to such eventualities 
is not to retreat from society, for this would be a merely temporary escape from 
danger. Long-term security cannot be guaranteed by oppressing the others either, 
for human beings individually or collectively can always find ways to resist or over-
come oppression. For Fichte, true social peace can only be achieved by creating 
a “whole” to be maintained at all times. Fichte’s proposition here is not hard to 
grasp: the shared predicament of uncertainty is best addressed collectively rather 
and actual positive law, which is, Diese bestimmte Menschen-Menge soll rechtlich nebeneinander leben (SW 
iii.161). This principle remains intact so long as the society itself remains intact.
30 Dass die Verwalter der öffentlichen Macht sich selbst wiedersprechen, oder eben, um sich nicht zu wieder-
sprechen, offenbare Ungerechtigkeiten begehen zu müssen (SW iii.169).
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than individually. This may not fully eliminate the uncertainty in society, but it 
will contain its harmful effects.31
in the pages following the above passage, Fichte goes on to clarify what he means 
by a “social whole” (das Ganze). He states that the social whole is not an entity that 
tends to reproduce itself; rather it is the totality of myriad contractual relations 
among individuals.32 He also takes care to distinguish his idea of contract from that 
of natural rights theorists. For Fichte, a contract is not simply a pact of convenience 
that helps the parties to realize their already constituted interests, as Locke has it; 
rather it calls for a transformation in the interests of the parties involved.33 Thus, 
the making of a Fichtean contract requires that the parties “back down” from their 
initial demands and modify them so as to render them compatible. For example, 
someone who wishes to establish a political party would not determine the goals 
of the party independently of those whose support he needs to create the party 
(SW iii.182–83). And those who join the party must in turn realize that there is 
a limit to what one may expect from a political party. Similar mutual concessions 
would have to be made by those who wish to exchange material goods and services 
(SW iii.215–37). Such interactions involve a process of mutual accommodation 
that is intended to yield an agreement or a balance of interests. Such agreements 
may then solidify into an institution if the parties involved regard it as a basis for 
further relations. This is not to say that every interaction yields an agreement or 
institution, nor that, once created, an institution can never be altered. We have 
seen that for Fichte social institutions can be abolished or reformed when social 
conditions call for it. What is anyway clear is that the institutional features of the 
social whole rest precariously on interactions among individual actors.
on Fichte’s account, the cohesion and continuance of the social whole ulti-
mately depends on the establishment of commonly held laws regulating, inter alia, 
political, social, and economic relations.34 Fichte makes it clear, however, that the 
true foundation of the social whole is not a particular law or an institution, but the 
“willingness” on the part of each individual to respond to and accommodate oth-
ers so long as others do the same.35 Fichte calls such volition “reciprocal volition” 
(Wechselwollen) (SW iii.88). Such is the volition that enables human beings to find 
a balance among their interests and define the terms of their coexistence. Such 
volition also keeps social relations in a stable state throughout institutional changes. 
Fichte seems to have in mind this flexible yet stable attitude toward others when, 
for example, he talks about the importance of redistribution of wealth in society. 
He argues that social peace can be maintained only if the property rights of some 
do not lead to the destitution of others. When this becomes the case, the well-off 
31 For more on “uncertainty” in Fichte’s political thought, see Jefferey Kinlaw, “Political obligation 
and imagination in Fichte’s Naturrecht” in Rockmore and Breazeale, Rights, Bodies and Recognition, 
176–81.
32 Durch Verträge der Einzelnen mit den Einzelnen ist das Ganze entstanden (SW iii.204).
33 Jeder an seiner Seite über die streitigen Objecte in etwas nachzugeben (SW iii.193, 128, 207).
34 i take it that the collective process of making such laws is what Fichte calls a “social contract.” 
For Fichte social contact would have several aspects, including a “property contract” (Eigentumvertrag) 
and a “contract for the transfer of public power” (Uebertragungsvertrag). Section §16 of the Naturrecht 
is devoted to elucidating the various aspects of a social contract.
35 Ich setze also notwendig unsere Gemeinschaft … als Resultat eines Wechselwollens (SW iii.88).
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must give up some of their rights to compensate the losses of the worse-off (SW 
iii.210–13). Thus social peace calls for the maintenance of a “balance” in society 
rather than preservation of an unjust pre-existing law or institution.36
For Fichte, reciprocal volition is not contingent on altruistic motives or on the 
assumption that humans are social by nature. it stems from the realization that 
reciprocity is a defining feature of social interaction: that in general one is treated 
by others as well as one treats others.37 Seen as a fact of social life, reciprocity 
urges one to consider not just what one wants to be, do, or have, but also how 
one’s actions will be perceived by and responded to by others. Reciprocity thus 
enables human beings to realize the importance of a shared language, determine 
the boundaries of social behavior, and identify areas of cooperation. To be sure, 
reciprocity can take a variety of forms, including competition, conflict, and also 
mutual accommodation. Fichte’s point, nonetheless, is that mutual accommoda-
tion is a most effective and stable way of finding a “balance” among individual 
interests, and of creating a social whole (SW iii.136).
These points make it clear that, for Fichte, citizenship entails a great deal more 
than merely abiding by collectively created laws and institutions of public life. it 
also involves taking a critical stance toward laws and institutions when they fail to 
serve the functions for which they are intended. So, on the one hand, Fichtean 
citizens can be identified with the social order in that they control the mechanisms 
that structure and stabilize it. But on the other hand, they are not so immersed 
in society that they cannot realize its flaws.38 it is not just that they are capable of 
criticizing their own society, but also that they can organize themselves into an 
active political force to reform it. 
Fichte does not use a specific term to refer to what we call “social criticism,” but 
he invokes the idea of it in his remarks on social change. The kind of criticism he 
seems to have in mind does not presuppose a utopian notion of perfect society; 
typically it is articulated in a response to an inconsistency or tension internal to a 
specific social setting. in this sense, Fichtean social criticism is “immanent.” Such 
is the criticism that underlies a young woman’s reluctance to marry someone cho-
sen by her father, since her reluctance can be construed as a rejection of paternal 
authority over marital decision-making, as well as of the candidate husband (SW 
iii.320–1). Such criticism can also be seen in the frustrations of the poor and 
unemployed with the economic system in place, especially when such frustrations 
lead to a reversal of their view of the society from a rightful order to an unfair and 
untrustworthy one that benefits some at the expense of others.39 
it is worth emphasizing here that Fichte does not consider social criticism as a 
threat to the social order; rather he takes it to be a possible way in which one can 
take part in the advancement and thus continued existence of it. The idea is that 
36 For more on the importance of redistribution in Fichte’s theory of rights, see my “Fichte and 
the idea of Liberal Socialism,” 62–69. Also see Allen W. Wood, “Kant and Fichte on Right, Welfare and 
economic Redistribution,” International Yearbook of German Idealism 2 (2004): 77–101
37 Dass ich ihn … so behandeln wolle wie er mich behandelt (SW iii.89; see also 41–53).
38 Dass [der Einzelne] in einer gewissen Rücksicht noch frei und unabhängig bleibt (SW iii.204).
39 Fichte refers to the reversal of the popular attitude toward government as Erwachen des Volkes 
(SW iii.158).
482 journal of the history of philosophy 48:4  october 2010
by expressing one’s discontent with a particular aspect of society, one in effect 
creates a chance for all others to rethink their attachment to it and reform it in a 
way that may make it more suitable to the emergent needs or interests of all.40
on Fichte’s account, social criticism often finds expression in extra-institutional 
settings, since it is directed at the established institutions. Yet Fichte believes that 
such criticism can be voiced and addressed within an institutional setting as well. 
indeed, unlike Rousseau, he argues that any “accountable” (verantwortlich) politi-
cal regime would have some institutionalized process (an ephorate) that subjects 
the regime itself to critical scrutiny and calls for reforms when necessary. Such a 
regime would be capable of self-reflection and self-correction (SW iii.157, 160–1). 
Yet Fichte also makes it clear that accountability cannot be defined exclusively in 
terms of a socially and historically contingent political institution, since it can be 
ensured in “infinitely many ways.”41 He believes so for two reasons.
The first is that different societies have different political “cultures” and so 
different political institutions.42 Some societies are governed by a monarch, while 
others by an unappealable yet replaceable committee. in yet other societies people 
play an active role in government through their delegates. in some cases the del-
egates are chosen by regular popular elections, but in others public offices are 
open only to the nobility so long as they qualify for the task. Fichte’s point here is 
not just that different societies have different types of government, but also that 
different societies define their relation to government differently and uphold 
different criteria for what constitutes governmental accountability. 
The second reason has to do with Fichte’s skepticism about the autonomy 
of institutions. Thus all aspects of government, including those responsible for 
reforming it on behalf of the people, i.e. the ephorate, are corruptible. For Fichte, 
this means that it is possible for a society to lose its institutional resources to self-
reform economically, politically, or legally (SW iii.181–87). in such situations, 
the only way people can influence the government may be civil disobedience, i.e. 
extra-legal or extra-institutional social mobilization.43 Such mobilization may take 
the form of “public tribunals” in town hall meetings, or it may develop under the 
direction of a vanguard party. in discussing such eventualities, Fichte’s aim is not 
to concede the anarchist claim that all political regimes are defective. it is rather 
that political accountability is not necessarily a function of formal procedures; it 
is sometimes a matter of the ability of a government to respond to social move-
ments that embody, under such conditions as sketched, the “constituent power” 
of the people.44 
if our analysis of Fichte’s idea of citizenship is sound, then it is not hard to 
see why Fichte regards citizenship as compatible with being dependent “solely” 
40 Fichte refers to such individuals as Aufforderer des Volks (SW iii.183).
41 SW iii.185. Hence Fichte talks about the “ephorate” in its “broadest possible sense” (SW 
iii.160).
42 Fichte’s expression is Cultur des Volkes (SW iii.286–89). my exegesis here is based on Fichte’s 
remarks throughout §16 of the Naturrecht.
43 Fichte portrays this condition as the “separation of the popular will from that of the govern-
ment” (SW iii.169).
44 Das Volk ist in der That und nach dem Rechte die höchste Gewalt (SW iii.182).
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on one’s own will. The citizen, on his account, is a discrete unit of agency that 
is involved in the making of the social order. i have suggested two ways in which 
this idea can be understood. First, each citizen plays an irreducible role in the 
creation and/or maintenance of social institutions that organize and stabilize 
social relations. Second, each is capable of developing and voicing a critique of 
existing institutions and, in so doing, creating a chance for all others to reconsider 
and reform them to make them appeal to all. Thus “humanity constitutes itself 
through the union of the free choice of all. … in this union there is no part that 
does not contain within itself the ground of its own determination” (SW iii.208–9). 
Fichte leaves little room for doubt here that citizenship thus takes the form of 
self-determination. This does not mean that society is determined by a particular 
citizen. For Fichte, as indicated, society arises from the myriad interactions of all. 
That is why, pace Hobbes, he does not rule out the possibility of society’s becoming 
a chaotic state of endless conflicts of attempts at self-determination. But we have 
also seen that for Fichte this is not the only form social order can take, because 
there is no reason why the parties cannot decide to accommodate one another and 
act according to rules that all can accept. Fichte’s claim that citizenship instanti-
ates self-determination boils down, then, to this: the parties to a social setting can 
organize it as a realm of the compatible self-determinations of all. All of this goes 
to show that the attainment or failure of self-determination for an individual in a 
social setting “depends on” the reactions of others.
The crucial move Fichte makes at this juncture is to say that the need to con-
sider the reactions of others in a social setting does not amount to a restriction of 
self-determination as such, but only a feature of the realm that makes it possible 
for individual citizens to exercise their capacity of practical self-determination 
(SW iii.9, 66). Also, the reactions of others in a social setting are not “hard” 
or “resistant” like material objects, but dependent on one’s own actions and 
reactions. The precise nature of a social setting and the content of each party’s 
self-determination in it are then ultimately up to each of those who make up the 
social setting at hand.
i take it that it is on the basis of these points that Fichte claims that member-
ship in a well-ordered society is a condition of self-conception of subjectivity. For if 
this realm is organized as a realm of mutually compatible self-determinations of 
citizens, then each citizen relates to this realm in the same way as consciousness 
relates to its own determinations. That is, each plays a role in determining not 
only whether there exists a politically organized society, but also the particular nature 
of its institutions. Also, this realm is always open—at least in principle—to reform 
in light of the criticisms of each citizen, provided that they are widely shared. So 
involvement in the social realm would not prevent one from thinking that one is 
capable of alternative determinations, a quality Fichte associates with subjectivity. 
it is therefore no accident that at the outset of the Naturrecht, Fichte declares that 
in a well-ordered society, self-conscious subjectivity takes the form of a determinate, 
individual agent among others:45“the rational being cannot posit itself as such 
45 For more on this point, see Günter Zöller, “The individuality of the i in Fichte’s Second Jena 
Wissenschaftslehre,” in New Essays on Fichte’s Later Jena Wissenschaftslehre, ed. d. Breazeale and T. Rockmore 
(evanston, iL: Northwestern University Press, 2002), 120–39.
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with self-consciousness without positing itself as individual, as one among many 
rational beings” (SW iii.8). So explicated, Fichte’s approach to subjectivity may 
seem indistinguishable from Hegel’s, according to which subjectivity is actualized 
only within society. despite the similarity, however, Fichte’s approach differs from 
Hegel’s in a crucial way. A central tenet of the latter is that such agency is possible 
only within already established social institutions, because only such institutions 
ensure the concreteness and determinacy that freedom, as Hegel defines it, re-
quires.46 Hegel believes that these criteria are best met by the institutions of the 
family, civil society, and the state of the nineteenth century Western european 
society. For Hegel, then, a most basic existential task facing human individuals is 
to identify with and reproduce those institutions, i.e. the duties that define them. 
While taking on particular social duties ultimately depends on the volitional assent 
of the individuals involved, Hegel argues that the formation or Bildung of individu-
als into agents who can realize their ends in modern society is not voluntary.47 This 
is because the process of personal development and integration into society takes 
place largely outside the control of the individuals involved. This seems to be a 
corollary of Hegel’s idea of social order as a self-sustaining whole.48
For Fichte, what constitutes the social order is not the social institutions, but 
the reciprocal relations among individual citizens through which institutions are 
created, maintained, or reformed. Therefore Fichte does not regard socialization 
as a process of “reconciling”49 with existing social structures, but as involvement in 
the collective task of defining or redefining the basic norms of social and politi-
cal life. That is why Fichtean citizens never fully identify with the institutions they 
create and uphold; they remain in this regard “free and independent.”50 Such 
independence, i have argued, is what in part enables them to think of themselves 
as subjects. 
Yet a common objection leveled against Fichte’s political theory is precisely 
that the relative independence of citizens from social institutions in this theory 
complicates its task of accounting for a stable social order.51 in this objection, first 
made by Hegel,52 it is unclear whether the uncertainty in society can be contained, 
if the parties do not fully identify with institutions that uphold law and order. Given 
the inevitable uncertainty of social life and the malleability of institutions, it is 
more likely that each would pursue his or her own self-preservation rather than be 
part of an unpredictable social life. if so, the critics have argued, the social order 
46 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 9–23. See also michael Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), chs. 5–6; Frederick Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s 
Social Theory (Cambridge, mA: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 4.
47 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §§147–149, 187,189. For more on this matter, see mi-
chael Theunissen, “The Repressed intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” in Hegel and Legal 
Theory, ed. d. Cornell, m. Rosenfeld and d.C. Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1991), 7–13.
48 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, sections §142–45.
49 Hardimon, Hegel’s Social Philosophy, ch. 1.
50 Noch frei und unabhängig bleibe (SW iii.204).
51 Siep, “methodische und Systematische Probleme in Fichtes Grundlage des Naturrechts,” 
290–306; Williams, “Recognition, Right and Social Contract,” 26–44; Verweyen, Recht und Sittlichkeit 
in J .G. Fichtes Gesellschaftslehre, 106–7.
52 Hegel, Differenz des Fichte’shen und Schelling’schen System der Philosophie, 64–65.
485self -pos i t i n g  a n d  r i g hts  i n  f i c ht e
cannot emerge from the spontaneous interactions among individuals as Fichte 
argues; rather it can be created only through force by an impartial yet unaccount-
able political power as Hobbes conceives of it. Part of the complaint here seems 
to be that citizenship is defined in terms of social situatedness and attachment to 
substantive political values, which would not be amenable to self-conception as 
an infinitely determinable free being.53
This objection is fair insofar as it reveals a gap in our exposition of Fichte’s 
ideas. We have shown that society can be a habitat for self-conscious subjectivity 
if it is organized as a realm of mutually compatible determinations of the parties. 
But we have not established that subjectivity is possible only on the condition of being 
part of such a society. Fichte makes this stronger claim when he asserts that “sum-
moning” by another human is the “point of origin” of human consciousness. This 
implies that a human being’s attachment to society is not reducible to contractual 
calculations of expected mutual benefit, including an external sphere of liberty; 
it lies in the conditions of the very possibility of self-conscious experience of the 
sensible world.54 To fully grasp how Fichte’s political thought relates to his account 
of subjectivity, then, we must look closer at this stronger claim.
4 .  s u m m o n i n g ,  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  r i g h t s
in the introduction to the Naturrecht, Fichte explicitly states that membership in a 
particular politically organized society is “arbitrary,” since the emergence of such 
a society depends on contingent social and personal factors (SW iii.14–15). Yet, 
Fichte explains, this is not to say that social association itself is a contingent matter: 
it is not up to human beings to decide whether they live in a social setting.55 So 
while it is necessary that they live in a society, it is contingent which particular society 
they inhabit. Fichte is not talking here about a biological necessity that makes hu-
man beings associate for the sake of survival. He has in mind, rather, what we may 
call an existential necessity, namely, that human beings cannot discover or realize 
their uniquely human potentialities outside the human society: “summoning to 
free self-activity is called education. All individuals must be educated to be human 
beings; otherwise they would not be human beings” (SW iii.39). Notice that Fichte 
identifies humanity in terms of “self-activity,” i.e. the conscious capacity to activate 
and determine oneself, which is characteristic of i-hood or subjectivity. He also as-
serts, however, that human beings cannot on their own become aware of this capacity; 
they need to be educated or “summoned” to do so. Fichte is aware that there is 
something paradoxical about the need to be educated by others about one’s own 
capacity for self-activity, and that this need requires an explanation. He offers two 
distinct yet related kinds of explanation. The first is a “deduction” or a series of 
transcendental arguments that purport to show the necessity of summoning for 
self-consciousness. The second is what we may call a phenomenology of what might 
53 Frederick Neuhouser makes something like this point in his introduction to the Cambridge 
edition of the Naturrecht.
54 martin Wayne also makes this point in his “is Fichte a Social Contract Theorist?” in Rockmore 
and Breazeale, Rights, Bodies and Recognition, 1–10.
55 Aller willkürlichen Wechselwirkung freier Wesen liegt eine unspüngliche und notwendige Wecheselwirkung 
derselben zum Grunde (SW iii.85).
486 journal of the history of philosophy 48:4  october 2010
have been the very first encounter of two human beings who thereby become self-
conscious. The remainder of this paper is an elucidation of these points, because 
they directly bear on Fichte’s thesis concerning the link between self-conception 
of subjectivity and rights, which is the central concern of this paper.
The transcendental deduction of summoning takes a central place in the 
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, and only a condensed version of it appears in the 
Naturrecht. in any case, it may be summarized as a four-step argument.56 The first 
step reiterates the essential feature of subjectivity as self-positing activity. Such 
activity defines subjectivity, since it enables its bearer to determine its thoughts 
and actions without depending on anything external to itself. The second step 
accompanies the first: when one determines oneself in a particular way, one rules 
out other possible determinations. This step portrays the freedom of the subject 
in terms of having alternatives by introducing the idea of a realm of all possible 
determinations available to the subject. The third step of the deduction draws 
a general conclusion from the first two: the idea of self-determining subjectiv-
ity entails the idea of a realm of multiple possible subjectivities, each of which 
determines itself in a particular way and distinguishes itself from others deter-
mined differently. The fourth step is an indictment of the previous three steps, in 
that it concedes the impossibility of inferring the “actuality” of self-determining 
subjectivity from transcendental arguments alone, because one only “discovers” 
such actuality and this discovery is necessarily mediated by an encounter with a 
subject “outside” oneself, which amounts to “summoning” (Aufforderung). The 
idea is that one cannot ascertain the actuality of oneself in terms of suppositions 
and possibilities “internal” to one’s own mind; one also needs to perceive in the 
“outer” world an instance of subjectivity other than oneself, with which one can 
nevertheless identify.
This four-step deduction establishes both how self-determining subjectivity 
is to be conceived and how it can be “found” in actuality. While this deduction 
identifies summoning, i.e. a “fact” in the sensible world as the necessary external 
condition of self-consciousness, it is not suited for the task of illustrating how 
exactly such summoning would take place. Fichte offers such an illustration in 
the Naturrecht, where he speculates as to the first encounter of two human beings, 
i.e. how otherwise entirely solitary human beings would react upon meeting one 
another for the very first time.
Fichte believes that an isolated human being would consider the encounter 
with another human as a radical change in the environment, since this would be 
the first time that one would encounter a being in the sensible world that did not 
move in an identifiable pattern, unlike animals that “either immediately flee in 
fear or get ready to kill and devour” (SW iii.37, 79, 81), or material objects and 
plants that are governed by easily identifiable mechanical causal laws (SW iii.29, 
115–6). Yet this encounter would complicate the life of the solitary human, be-
cause it would not be immediately obvious how one would relate to that similar 
looking but unpredictable other, while it is clear that some response is needed, 
which calls for a determination.
56 my remarks here are based on §19 of the Nova Methodo and on §3 of the Naturrecht.
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For Fichte, the need to make a determination on how to treat the other in this 
scenario would be experienced by the hitherto solitary human being as a “sum-
moning” to engage in “free action.”57 it would be a summoning, since one faces 
here a decision occasioned by the “presence” of another. And it would be a sum-
moning to “free” action, since this decision would not be bound by any internal 
or external constraint.58 The solitary human being would not have any prior social 
experience or therefore a norm that may pertain to this decision; nor would the 
conduct of the other compel one to think or act in any particular way. Since the 
other would not immediately attack, one’s decision would not be determined by 
survival instinct. moreover, there could be no predicting how the other would act 
in the future given the uncertainty of the volitional makeup of the other. Thus 
this decision would be made under complete uncertainty.
So far we have described the encounter from the first-person perspective. 
Fichte makes it clear, however, that the experience would be reciprocal, since the 
encounter could take place in the way sketched only if both parties experienced 
the uncertainty the same way (SW iii.44–53). That is, each would have to regard 
the other as similar in appearance but not explainable by familiar causal laws, 
and none of them would have to feel compelled by the other to think or act in 
any particular way. Given the mutuality of the experience, Fichte speculates, each 
would adopt the same attitude toward the other: each would try to guess what the 
other would do, refrain from acting unilaterally, act in ways that would not be 
perceived by the other as hostile, and thus avoid pointless mutual violence. The 
parties would thus find themselves in a “reciprocal interaction.”
Fichte refers to this interaction as “original and necessary” not just because it 
underlies and makes possible all other social interactions, but also because it is 
necessary to discovering what is uniquely and essentially human, i.e. the concep-
tion of oneself as a self-determining unit of agency (SW iii.53, 85). in the above 
scenario, the parties have no knowledge of one another before meeting, and only 
by interacting do they find out about each other. Fichte believes that each party, 
synthesizing the “manifold” data about the other, would form the “judgment” that 
the other is a self-standing center of activity, since the actions of the other would 
not seem to be determined by anything external to the other. This judgment about 
the other would be tentative because it can be falsified later. Still, it would yield 
the concept of a “self-determined” being, an instance of which a solitary human 
being had not seen before. But once formed, this concept becomes available for 
self-ascription as well. indeed, Fichte argues that this is how the hitherto solitary 
human being would thereafter think of himself or herself.59 This is, first, because 
the interaction would enable one to make a determination for the first time with-
out feeling compelled to act in any way. one would not be responding here to 
constantly repeated natural phenomena over which one would have no control 
whatsoever; rather, one would make a determination regarding the determination 
of another human responding to one’s earlier determination and so on. And this 
57 Aufforderung des Subjects zu einer freien Wirksamkeit (SW iii.36).
58 So gewiss es handelt, wählt es durch absolute Selbstbetimmung (SW iii.34).
59 Die Person soll in dem gegenwärtig beschreibenden Momente sich finden als frei (SW iii.63).
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back and forth of mutual determinations would not be a mechanical process; it 
would be driven by each party’s repeated attempts to guess what the other had in 
mind, find signs or gestures that could be grasped by the other, and determine 
the “boundaries” that one must not cross so as not to upset the fragile peace. 
moreover, there is no reason why this interaction would necessarily turn into an 
insolvable war for survival, since it naturally would tend to take form of mutual 
accommodation whereby each would jockey for a “sphere” of activity that did 
not conflict with the similar sphere of the other. in Thomas Schelling’s words, it 
would take the form of a “game of coordination”:60 “i posit myself as a rational 
and free being in opposition to [C]61 only by ascribing reason and freedom to 
him as well and, with this, by assuming that he has likewise freely chosen within a 
sphere separate from mine” (SW iii.46). Although Fichte introduces the idea of 
summoning and the kind of interaction it generates while speculating about the 
imagined first encounter of solitary humans, he does not consider such interaction 
as a mere object of imagination. He observes it being exemplified in a variety of 
ways in actual social settings. He argues, for example, that education is basically the 
summoning of children by their teachers to discover and exercise their faculties 
and capacities in ways that they cannot on their own (SW iii.358–59, 365). Yet 
education can achieve this end only if the teachers allow their pupils the freedom 
to self-discover and flourish. For Fichte, summoning takes place among adults as 
well. Among adults it often takes the form of an exchange of ideas or experiences 
that inspire the parties to update their ideas and attitudes about the world or about 
themselves.62 For example, as discussed earlier, sometimes it is only by talking to 
another that one can realize that one was subjected to injustice by a third party, 
and that one must fight it. This is the sort of “awakening” political activists hope 
to achieve when approaching their potential comrades.63
Summoning interactions are, then, integral to social life, in that they shape the 
beliefs and attitudes human beings have about the social order, as well as about 
themselves. But the central point here is that such interactions do not always 
necessarily presuppose a pre-existing rule or institution, but merely an openness 
to the possibility of being in some way stimulated or inspired by an unpredictable 
but non-hostile other: “i can treat a rational being as a rational being … not if he 
recognizes me in his own conscience, which concerns morality, or in the company 
of others, which concerns the state, but if he recognizes me according to his and 
my consciousness synthetically united in one” (SW iii.44–45). Fichte later refers 
to such interaction as a “relation of right” (Rechtsverhältniss) (SW iii.52). Now 
this portrayal may seem confused, since Fichte goes out of his way to emphasize 
the morally and institutionally indeterminate nature of summoning interactions. 
60 Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, mA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 
83–118.
61 Fichte uses [C] without indicating a referent. 
62 Nur freie Wechselwirkung durch Begriffe und nach Begriffen, nur Geben und Empfangen von Erkenntnissen 
ist der eigentümliche Charakter der Menschheit, durch welchen allein jede Person sich als Menschen unwidersprech-
lich erhärtet (SW iii.40).
63 Fichte describes such moments in the history of a society as an Epoche des Erwachens des Volkes 
(SW iii.158).
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Yet this is not confusion, but an indication that fixity is not a quality that Fichte 
necessarily associates with relations governed by the concept of right.64 i take it 
that Fichte’s refutation of natural rights theories rests precisely on this point: hu-
man beings can interact in peace and harmony without necessarily subscribing to 
predefined, “categorical” notions of entitlement.65 That is, social interactions can 
be mutually respectful even if the parties “recognize” each other merely as “form-
able.”66 This means that each allows the other to act any way he or she chooses 
as long as these actions do not clash with one’s own. And each would be open to 
accommodating the emergent needs or interests of the other so long as the other 
reciprocates. So understood, the “relation of right” is not a codified, patterned, 
or institutionalized relation; rather it takes the form of a negotiation to arrange 
the social space into non-conflicting spheres of activity.
Fichte makes it clear that such interaction is not incompatible with law or mo-
rality. He argues, on the contrary, that interactions that do not yield, or are not 
structured by, law or morality tend to be unpredictable, unstable, or “problematic” 
(SW iii.46, 124). moral and legal norms lend structure and consistency to such 
interactions by specifying the content or boundary of the mutual liberties or duties 
of the parties. once stabilized by such norms, a “relation of right” becomes “ju-
ridical,” in that it exemplifies thereafter clearly defined, and ethically or legally 
enforceable rights.67 The parties then would no longer “recognize” one another 
as adaptable agents, but as “right-holders” (Subject des Rechtes) who are entitled 
to determinate, fixed “spheres” of external freedom. it is essential to emphasize, 
however, that such spheres are fixed only to the extent that they are viewed and 
treated as such by the parties, and nothing can prevent the parties from redrawing 
the permissible boundaries of those spheres. 
Thus Fichte’s concept of right lends itself to both juridical and non-juridical 
relations that are linked in the way just sketched.68 Notice that this distinction cor-
relates with the distinction Fichte makes between two kinds of freedom associated 
with subjectivity. The first is the uniquely human capacity to transcend the confines 
of the natural world and act on self-determined purposive concepts. We have seen 
that a human being can be free in this sense only by participating in the collective 
enterprise of creating and maintaining the social institutions that enable the parties 
to co-exist without infringing on one another’s sphere of external freedom. The 
second kind of freedom can be called “infinite determinability.” Such freedom 
64 After all, the entire §3 of the Naturrecht is an account of the development of a “relation of right” 
in the absence of pre-existing legal or moral structures.
65 Es ist sonach im Sinne wie man das Wort oft genommen hat, gar kein Naturrecht (SW iii.148).
66 Fichte’s expressions are Bildsamkeit and Bestimmbarket (SW iii.79, 133, 60–61). i am suggesting 
here that “summoning” implies the recognition of the other as a free but adaptable being. Honneth 
makes a similar point in his “die Transzendentale Notwendigkeit von intersubjectivität,” 77–78. For 
an alternative view, see Siep, Praktische Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus, 47–48.
67 Fichte refers to what i call here “juridical” rights as äusseres Recht (SW iii.127, 361–62).
68 i do not agree with owen Ware that Fichte’s distinction between “categorical” and “problematic” 
types of recognition is equivalent to a distinction between “action” and “cognition.” i take it that both 
types of recognition are oriented toward action, and they are embodied, respectively, in the juridical 
and non-juridical relations associated with the concept of right. See his otherwise very helpful “Fichte’s 
Voluntarism,” European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2010): 262–82.
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cannot be realized within a particular external sphere or institution; it is exercised 
only by participating in a social interaction through which one is “summoned” 
to think and act in ways that are otherwise unimaginable.69 Such is the nature of 
relations that make social criticism and social change possible. 
i have argued in this paper that these two parallel distinctions are brought 
together within the thesis that underlies Fichte’s political thought, namely, that 
rights (or relations identified by the concept of right) are best understood as the 
conditions under which human beings can be and become aware of themselves 
as self-positing subjects. if this construal of Fichte’s thesis is correct, then it is 
not difficult to grasp what fundamentally distinguishes Fichte’s political thought 
from those of Rousseau or Hegel, in relation to which Fichte’s is most fruitfully 
understood. Unlike Hegel, who ascribes agency to social institutions, Fichte con-
siders individual citizens as the active agents in the social world, since they are 
the ultimate source of reform as well as stability in society. Yet Fichte does so 
without resorting to the kind of libertarianism that pertains to Rousseau’s social 
and political thought. Rousseau believes that the main reason to enter political 
society is to be free from the domination, competition, and judgments of oth-
ers. He typically argues that such freedom is best achieved in a “withdrawal from 
society” whereby one minimizes social contact.70 For Rousseau, more precisely, 
membership in a “political” society is compatible with intellectual, economic and 
volitional self-reliance. Fichte, in contrast, calls for participation in a whole array 
of social, cultural, economic as well as political relations with others, and thus for 
playing a role in the determination of the social world. 71 This is because social 
membership, thus understood, is part of what it takes to be, and become aware 
of oneself as, a self-determining subject as Fichte conceives of it.
69 For more on the conceptual link between “determinability” and “intersubjectivity” in Fichte’s 
philosophy, see Allen Wood, “Fichte’s intersubjective i,” Inquiry 49 (2006): 62–79.
70 Rousseau praises such life throughout Emile and Reveries of a Solitary Walker. For more on the 
theme of isolation in Rousseau, see Timothy o’Hagan, “Rousseau on Amour-Propre,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 99 (1999): 91–107; Tzevan Todorov, Frail Happiness, trans. J. Scott and R. Zaratsky 
(University Park: Penn State University Press, 2001), ch. 3. See also N.J.H. dent, Rousseau: An Introduc-
tion to His Psychological, Social and Political Theory (New York: Basic Blackwell, 1989), 104–8.
71 Fichte does not think that it is volitionally impossible for a human individual, after being raised 
in a society, to choose to live outside society. But he considers such an individual as self-destructive 
if he or she is aware that, in choosing a solitary life one gives up not only on the possibility of taking 
part in recognitive social relations that establish social peace, but also on the chance to benefit from 
the experience and cooperation of others in one’s struggle for survival; that is, this choice leads to a 
life “under the direction of nature” (SW iii.48, 209).
